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THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY ON ATROCITYRELATED PROSECUTIONS IN THE COURTS
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
Yaël Ronen*
INTRODUCTION
The establishment of international criminal tribunals since the
1990s has been part of a general move by the international
community toward a clear condemnation of atrocities and an
expression of a collective determination to end impunity. Yet the
international tribunals cannot achieve these goals by themselves.1
Domestic courts are an essential component in the enforcement of
international criminal law because they help to ensure that
accountability does not remain the lot of an exclusive few while
thousands of perpetrators walk free. Without large-scale domestic
action, the international community’s message of ending impunity, as
expressed in the establishment of international tribunals, would be
severely undermined. This holds true for the era of the International
* Yaël Ronen, Senior Lecturer, Sha’arei Mishpat Law School, Hod
Hasharon, Israel. This article was written as part of the DOMAC Project, a
research program funded by the Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities
Programme of the Seventh Framework Progamme for E.U. Research (FP7), 20082011. Sources include personal interviews conducted by DOMAC researches in
2008 with professionals in the ICTY and in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The identity of
interviewees has been kept confidential; transcripts and related information are on
file with the author. Section IV.B draws, inter alia, on an early DOMAC report by
Alejandro Chehtman, later published as Developing Bosnia and Herzegovina´s Capacity to
Process War Crimes Cases: Critical Notes on a “Success Story,” 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 547
(2011). I am grateful to Judge Shireen Avis Fischer, Thorbjorn Bjornsson, Rotem
Giladi, Yuval Shany, Harmen van der Wilt, and the anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments on earlier versions.
1 Yuval Shany, How Can International Criminal Courts Have a Greater Impact
upon National Criminal Proceedings? Lessons from the First Two Decades of International
Criminal Justice in Operation, 46 ISR. L. REV. 431 (2013).
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Criminal Court no less than for the experience of its ad hoc
antecedents.
The international and the domestic arenas are not isolated
from each other. They interact both intentionally and implicitly,
including through judicial bodies. The latter interaction naturally
varies from one instance to another depending on the particular
circumstances. Yet because the shift in emphasis from international
to domestic enforcement of international criminal law is a recurring
one, the question arises whether there are characteristic patterns in
the institutional interaction that allow for lessons to be learned as to
best practices, or, on the other hand, as to potential pit falls in future
processes. This article concerns the experience in effecting this shift
from international to domestic enforcement of international criminal
law with respect to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), namely the
interaction between the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the courts of BiH.
In the case of BiH, the distinction between international and
domestic institutions is not self-evident. While the ICTY’s
international character is beyond dispute, as is the domestic character
of the ordinary courts of BiH, the classification of the federal-level
BiH court dealing with international crimes is less straightforward. It
was set up while BiH was under international administration, and it
employs international, as well as national, judges and prosecutors.
However, the source of authority of the court is domestic law; it
applies domestic law, and, ultimately, will employ only national
personnel.2 Thus, while at present it is best characterised as a hybrid,
its terms of reference envisage an entirely domestic mechanism. For
the purposes of the present article, institutions within BiH,
irrespective of their provenance and composition, are therefore
regarded as domestic, although the hybrid character of the federallevel BiH court will be analyzed in context.

Cf. Cesare P. R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies:
The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 J. OF INT’L L. & POL. 709, 713-14 (1999) (defining an
international tribunal as one which must have been established by an international
legal instrument and resorts to international law).
2
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Sections I to III of this article are introductory and therefore
brief. Section I provides a historical and institutional background to
the situation in BiH; Section II recalls the international response to
the mass atrocities in BiH, namely the establishment of the ICTY;
and Section III reviews the domestic judicial response of BiH to the
mass atrocities. Section IV constitutes the heart of the article and
considers the impact of the ICTY on the domestic response to warrelated crimes through qualitative, quantitative, and normative
parameters. The article concludes with a tentative characterization
and assessment of the ICTY’s impact on the domestic response.
This article does not purport to provide a comprehensive
study of the international involvement in BiH, the significance of
which cannot be overstated in the context of addressing war-related
crimes. Important international processes and actors other than the
ICTY, such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and the
European Union (E.U.), have undoubtedly affected the policy and
practice in BiH, arguably to an even greater extent than the ICTY.
While this article is nonetheless limited to the potential trickle-down
effect of the ICTY in its direct interaction with the domestic legal
system, there is no doubt that political stances toward the
international involvement have had an impact on the reception in
BiH of the ICTY and, accordingly, on its ability to impact domestic
institutions—particularly the judiciary. Arguably, whatever success
the ICTY has had in influencing BiH institutions was the result of the
tight control that the international community has exercised over the
country, and, correspondingly, limited to the state of BiH, where it
enjoyed such control.
I. BACKGROUND
BiH’s descent into ethnic war in 1992 was the culmination of
over seven decades of pent-up ethnic animosity among Serbs, Croats,
and Bosnians, nurtured by forced political union under Yugoslav
statehood in its various forms. In fact, the establishment of the
Republic of BiH under Tito’s Yugoslavia was itself a tool of ethnic
management, aimed at maintaining a balance between the two
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dominant ethnicities in Yugoslavia, the Serbs and the Croats, both of
which lay claims to the territory of the Republic.3
Tito’s death in 1980, combined with the end of Cold War
rivalry and the decline of communist ideology in the rest of Europe
in the 1980s, led to the severe weakening of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)’s crucial unifying factors. The
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991-92 came as no surprise. In BiH the
process was fashioned by interethnic disputes and heavy involvement
of Serbia and Croatia, both acting in pursuit of their territorial
aspirations. When BiH declared independence on March 3, 1992,
large-scale violence had already erupted within it with the support of
the kin states.4
At the outset, the BiH conflict was predominantly between
Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats backed by Croatia on one side,
and Bosnian Serbs backed by Serbia on the other side. By the end of
May 1992, two thirds of BiH territory, including the soon-to-benamed Republika Srpska, was in Bosnian-Serb hands. The second
stage of the war began in May 1993 with the collapse of cooperation
between Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims. This conflict lasted
until the spring of 1994, when the combined territory held by the
Croat and Bosnian-Muslim government forces was united into the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the number of warring
parties in BiH was again reduced to two. The last stage of the
conflict, from early 1994 on, was marked by NATO’s military
intervention. It culminated in May 1995, when, in reaction to Serb
refusal to comply with a NATO ultimatum to withdraw heavy
weaponry from around sieged enclaves, NATO forces launched air
strikes on Serb targets in BiH and in Serbia. Further air strikes led to

See Dusko Doder, Yugoslavia: New War, Old Hatreds, 91 FOREIGN POL’Y
3, 12 (1993).
4 Prosecutor v. Dragomir Milošević, Case No. IT-98-29/1, Judgment,
para. 22 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12, 2007),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/dragomir_milosevic/tjug/en/071212.pdf.
3
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U.S.-sponsored peace talks in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995,
which produced the Dayton Peace Accords in December 1995.5
Estimates as to the number of victims of the war vary
enormously, ranging from 25,000 to 329,000.6 Former ICTY
Prosecutor Carla del Ponte endorsed a finding of 103,000 lives lost.7
Reliable data suggests that about two-thirds of the victims were
Muslim, over a quarter Serb, and the remaining eight percent Croat.8
Approximately one million BiH citizens became refugees during the
war, and another one million were internally displaced. Over a third
of pre-war residential dwellings were destroyed and the technical and
social infrastructure was significantly damaged.9 As a consequence,
the ethnic composition of entire regions was affected. In the territory
of the present-day Federation of BiH, which is predominantly
Muslim-Croat, the share of non-Serbs had increased by over forty
percent, while in the Serb-populated area that now forms the
Republika Srpska, the share of non-Serbs had fallen by over eighty
percent.10

5 Paula Pickering, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/700826/Bosnia-and-Herzegovina
(last
visited Feb. 6, 2014).
6 Ewa Tabeau & Jakub Bijak, War-related Deaths in the 1992–1995 Armed
Conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Critique of Previous Estimates and Recent Results, 21
EUR. J. OF POPULATION 187, 192 (2005).
7 CARLA DEL PONTE & CHUCK SUDETIC, MADAME PROSECUTOR:
CONFRONTATIONS WITH HUMANITY’S WORST CRIMINALS AND THE CULTURE OF
IMPUNITY 39 (2008).
8 PATRICK BALL, EWA TABEAU & PHILIP VERWIMP, HOUSEHOLDS IN
CONFLICT NETWORK (HICN), THE BOSNIAN BOOK OF DEAD: ASSESSMENT OF
THE DATABASE (FULL REPORT) 29 (2007), http://www.hicn.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2012/07/rdn5.pdf.
9 OSCE MISSION TO BOSN. & HERZ., HUM. RTS. DEP’T, WAR CRIMES
TRIALS BEFORE THE DOMESTIC COURTS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA:
PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES 3 (2005) [hereinafter OSCE 2005].
10 Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavisić, Case No. IT-00-39&40/1, Sentencing
Judgment, para. 36 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 27, 2003),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf;
HELSINKI
COMM. FOR HUM. RTS. IN REPUBLIKA SRPSKA, MINORITY RIGHTS IN REPUBLIKA
SRPSKA (1999), www.minelres.lv/reports/bosnia/bosnia-rs_NGO.htm (estimating
20,000 Muslims in RS in 1999).
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The Dayton Peace Accords outline the new constitutional
design of BiH. The State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH, or “the
state”) comprises two administrative divisions (“entities”): the
Bosnian-Serb Republika Srpska (RS), the Bosnian/Croat Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH), and the internationallysupervised Brčko district. The RS is a unitary entity dominated by
Bosnian Serbs, while FBiH is itself also a federal entity, with power
shared between Bosnian Muslims and Croats.11 The Dayton Accords
established the Office of the High Representative (OHR) to facilitate
the implementation of the Accords. BiH has hosted a number of
peacekeeping forces. Since 2004, the E.U. has been responsible for
peacekeeping operations, while NATO maintains a headquarters in
Sarajevo to assist the country with defense reform.12
The BiH Constitution attached to the Dayton Agreement13
delineates the division of competences between the entities and the
state. The state is vested with comparatively few powers and
competences,14 and residual competences lie with the entities.15 The
entities exercise a wide measure of independence, and the
relationship between their governing bodies and those of the state,
including judicial bodies, is hardly hierarchical. Indeed, in some
respects, BiH and FBiH are as foreign to RS as BiH is to Croatia or
Serbia. Moreover, the judicial institutions of the state of BiH are
eminently affected by the international administration of the country

11 EUR. COMM’N FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH L. (VENICE COMM’N),
OPINION ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
AND THE POWERS OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE, CDL-AD(2005)004, 7 (Feb.
22, 2005),
http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL(2005
)021-e.
12 NATO ends SFOR Mission, NATO (last updated Dec. 6, 2004),
www.nato.int/docu/update/2004/12-december/e1202a.htm.
13 U.N. Secretary-General, General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Nov. 30, 1995),
http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/BA_951121_DaytonAgr
eement.pdf, [hereinafter Dayton Agreement].
14 CONSTITUTION OF BOSN. & HERZ., Dec. 14, 1995, art. III.1,
http://www.ohr.int/dpa/default.asp?content_id=372
[hereinafter
BIH
CONSTITUTION].
15 Id. at art. III.3.
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since 1995, whereas the impact of the international administration on
the courts of FBiH and RS has been much more limited.
BiH has been experiencing an uneasy peace since the
conclusion of the Dayton Accords. It receives extensive international
assistance, but the economy remains weak. No less importantly,
political paralysis plagues the country’s institutions; more than one
senior official has suggested the country was “dysfunctional,” with its
constituent entities disagreeing on fundamental structural questions.
This dynamic has prevented necessary constitutional reform.16
Dissatisfaction with the constitutional structure of the country is
particularly forceful in RS, where the possibility is occasionally raised
of taking steps toward secession.17 As will be demonstrated, this lack
of unity has had an impact on the interaction between institutions
and on the sense of a commitment to act jointly toward the
achievement of common goals.
II. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE MASS ATROCITIES:
THE ICTY
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council unanimously adopted
Resolution 827 under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, establishing
the ICTY and adopting the Tribunal’s Statute.18 The Tribunal’s
subject-matter jurisdiction extended to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, and genocide.19 Resolution 827 made particular reference

16 Progress Hostage to Political Blockages in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina,
NATO Parliamentarians Hear in Balkans, NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY (June
28, 2010), www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2168.
17 Sabina Niksic, Bosnian Serbs Adopt Controversial Referendum Law, BALKAN
INSIGHT (Feb. 11, 2010), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbsadopt-controversial-referendum-law; Political deadlock in Bosnia-Herzegovina ahead of
key meeting, DEUTSCHE WELLE (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.dw.de/politicaldeadlock-in-bosnia-herzegovina-ahead-of-key-meeting/a-5279682.
18 U.N Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph
2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_re808_1993_en.pdf.
19 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 5, Annex to S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993),
http://www.icty.org/sid/135[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
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to BiH as the site of reported widespread and flagrant violations of
international humanitarian law.20
The establishment of the ICTY was accompanied by
statements on the need for justice, deterrence, promotion of the rule
of law, reconciliation, and maintenance of peace.21 But it was also
motivated by less-articulated political goals, such as appeasement of
international public opinion and avoidance of military intervention.22
It is not clear that the judicial role of the Tribunal was taken seriously
by Security Council Members at the time.23
Domestic prosecutions did not feature prominently on the
agenda of the drafters of the ICTY Statute, but it was clear from the
outset that the bulk of cases related to the mass atrocities in the
former Yugoslavia were to be handled eventually by national courts.
Only at a relatively late stage was it recognized that only if the ICTY
succeeds in sustaining its action locally would it really meet the
expectations of the Security Council’s resolutions.24
At the same time, in light of the ongoing armed conflict and
the deep-rooted animosity among the various ethnic and religious
groups which initially made domestic courts unlikely to be willing or
S.C. Res. 827, preambular para. 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25,
1993), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/peace/docs/scres827.html.
21 See U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May
25, 1993), for the comments made by Security Council members upon the adoption
of Resolution 808 (Feb. 22, 1993) and Resolution 827 (May 25, 1993), which
established the Tribunal.
22 YVES BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 146 (1999); Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making
Peace: Reflections on the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World
Politics, 6 TULANE J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 5, 46-49 (1998); STEVEN R. RATNER,
JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 212-14 (3d ed. 2009); ANTONIO CASSESE,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 326 (2d ed. 2008).
23 David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, in THE PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 185, 187 (Roger S.
Clark & Madeleine Sann eds., 1996).
24 See Frederic Mégret, The Legacy of the ICTY as Seen Through Some of its
Actors and Observers, 4 GOETTINGEN J. OF INT’L L. 1011, 1030 (2011) (quoting
former ICTY President Pocar).
20
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able to conduct fair trials,25 ICTY Statute Article 9(2) provides the
Tribunal with primacy over domestic courts, of which it has made
only infrequent use.26 The majority of indictments before the ICTY
have been for crimes committed on the territory of BiH, and the
majority of indictees have been Serbs and Bosnian-Serbs.27
In 2003 the Security Council adopted the ICTY-devised
“completion strategy,” aimed at ensuring that the Tribunal conclude
its mission in a timely way and in coordination with domestic legal
systems in the region.28 The completion strategy required that the
ICTY focus its efforts on “the most senior leaders suspected of being
most responsible for crimes within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction”29 and
transfer “intermediate and lower ranked accused” to competent
domestic jurisdictions,30 while ensuring that basic human rights
standards and procedural safeguards are met. In fact, ICTY President
Pocar has noted that the Completion Strategy was a strategy not so
much to “complete” the work of the ICTY as it was designed to
allow continuation by domestic actors of those activities that have

25 CASSESE, supra note 22, at 339; PAUL R. WILLIAMS AND MICHAEL P.
SCHARF, PEACE WITH JUSTICE? WAR CRIMES AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 96-98 (2002).
26 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Duško Tadic a/k/a/ “Dule”, Case No. IT-94-1AR72, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction,
para. 52 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (taking over at the
investigative stage from Germany); Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Mladić & Stanišić, Case
No. IT-95-5-D, Trial Chamber Decision on the Bosnian Serb Leadership Deferral
Proposal (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 16, 1995) (taking over
from BiH); Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemović, Case No. ICTY-IT-96-22-T,
Sentencing Judgment, para. 2 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29,
1996) (taking over from FRY (Serbia and Montenegro)).
27 Over two thirds of the indictees are of Serb ethnicity. Over three
quarters of the indictments filed until 2000 were of Ethnic Serbs. YAËL RONEN,
WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF SHARON AVITAL & OREN TAMIR, PROSECUTIONS AND
SENTENCING IN THE WESTERN BALKANS, DOMAC/4, graph 6.2.2 (2010),
http://www.domac.is/media/domac/DOMAC-4-2010.pdf.
28 S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); S.C. Res.
1534, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
29 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 28, at preambular para. 7.
30 Id. at preambular para. 8.
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been initially put in motion by the ICTY.31 Altogether, thirteen cases
have been referred from the ICTY to domestic jurisdictions. Of
those, eleven were referred to BiH. The ICTY also sent back to
domestic jurisdictions cases that had been investigated by the OTP
but in which no indictment was filed in the ICTY by the deadline set
at the end of 2004.
III. THE DOMESTIC RESPONSE TO THE MASS ATROCITIES
The post-conflict treatment of international crimes in BiH is
unique among the countries of the former Yugoslavia. First, the
volume of potential cases relating to BiH is immense, because the
overwhelming majority of crimes were committed on its territory and
against its population. Second, international crimes are addressed
today principally at the level of the federal state, which is
characterized by a weak central government in comparison with the
strong entity structures (the FBiH and RS). Not unique, but
significant for the analysis of domestic practice, is the fact that the
legal system in BiH is relatively new, containing both institutions and
norms that were only put in place in 2003.
In the immediate aftermath of the armed conflict, the
appointment process for judges in the two entities continued to be
controlled by the ruling political parties. There were frequent
accusations of partiality, corruption, and judicial incompetence.
Judges were often forced to supplement their meagre salaries with
“outside” work. This not only deprived judges of time that should
have been devoted to judicial duties, but it also risked compromising
the judges’ independent decision-making abilities.32 In addition, the
system lacked basic infrastructure. The weakness of the judiciary was
compounded by complexities in the legal framework and
inappropriate procedural laws to effectively prosecute and defend
alleged war criminals, a lack of qualified defense attorneys, and an
31 Fausto Pocar, Completion or Continuation Strategy? Appraising Problems and
Possible Developments in Building the Legacy of the ICTY, 6 J. OF INT’L CRIM. L. 655, 661
(2008).
32 Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an Embattled Region - Creating and
Implementing the “Rules of the Road” for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1,
5-6 (1999).
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inability to monitor trials or summon witnesses. Other obstacles were
poor case preparation by prosecutors, ineffective witness protection
mechanisms,33 and lack of cooperation between the entities.
The international community did not intervene in the reestablishment of law enforcement institutions.34 The Constitution of
BiH, annexed to the Dayton Accords, only re-established the
Constitutional Court. Until 1997, administration of justice was under
the exclusive responsibility of the entities (with the exception of a
BiH-level Constitutional Court). In 1997, a new Ministry of Civil
Affairs and Communications was established at the BiH level, which
was given responsibility for dealing with “international and interentity criminal law enforcement,” including international legal
assistance.
Most law enforcement, including the domestic prosecution of
war-related crimes, was left to the entities.35 Only in the early 2000s
did the OHR initiate a comprehensive reform of the legal system in
BiH. This included restructuring and downsizing of courts and
prosecutors’ offices and replacing all judges and prosecutors36 in an
effort to secure the independence of the judiciary and establish an
appropriate balance of judges of different ethnicities. In 2003, a
Ministry of Justice was created at the BiH level, which by then

33 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOOKING FOR JUSTICE: THE WAR CRIMES
CHAMBER
IN
BOSNIA
AND
HERZEGOVINA
(2006),
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/02/07/looking-justice [hereinafter HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH 2006].
34 Interview with NGO researchers in The Hague, BiH, and ICTY (Jan.
2009). Interviewees were selected based on their seniority and familiarity with the
relevant justice systems. They included senior officials in various the ICTY units,
international and domestic judges and prosecutors, E.U. and OSCE officials, and
local NGOs. Since many of the interviewees did not want the information they
provided to be attributed to them, they are referred to in generic terms.
35 William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of
the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 286-87
(2008).
36 E.g., Wolfgang Petritsch, High Representative, Speech to the U.N.
Security
Council
(Sept.
5,
2000),
http://www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/pressa/default.asp?content_id=3236; OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 9.
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included the State (federal) Court and State (federal) Prosecutor’s
Office.37
Until 2005, trials for war-related crimes were held only in the
courts of the entities. In FBiH, jurisdiction over war-related crimes
lies with ten cantonal courts, where 174 individuals, mostly of Serb
ethnicity, have been indicted from 1992 to September 2009. Of these,
146 have received final verdicts. In RS, jurisdiction lies with 5 district
courts, and forty-five individuals have been indicted and eventually
received a verdict by 2009, the overwhelming majority of whom were
of Serb ethnicity. All but five of the indictments in RS were
submitted in or after 2003. Appeals on these courts’ judgments are
heard by the Supreme Court of the respective entity. Since 2005, warrelated crimes have also been tried at the War Crimes Section (WCS)
within the State Court of BiH (State Court).38 The WCS employs
both domestic and international judges39 and exercises primary
jurisdiction over war-related crimes, namely genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes, through both trial and appeals chambers.40
It retains cases or transfers them to entity courts depending on their
complexity and sensitivity.41 By September 2009, 139 individuals had
been indicted for war-related crimes before the WCS at the State
Court, most of them of Serb ethnicity. By the end of the same period,
seventy-two of the defendants had received a final verdict.42

37 BIH PUB. ADMIN. REFORM COORDINATOR’S OFF., FUNCTIONAL
REVIEW OF THE BIH JUSTICE SECTOR (2005), parco.gov.ba/?id=408.
38 BALKAN INVESTIGATIVE REPORTING NETWORK (BIRN), PURSUIT
FOR JUSTICE: GUIDE TO THE WAR CRIMES CHAMBER OF THE BIH COURT 7 (vol.
II) (hereinafter BIRN, PURSUIT OF JUSTICE).
39 For a discussion of this policy, see infra text accompanying notes 87-95.
40 CRIM. PROC. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art. 315.
41 For a discussion of this policy, see infra text accompanying notes 14046; NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR WORK ON WAR CRIMES CASES (2008),
www.mpr.gov.ba/userfiles/file/Projekti/Drzavna%20strategije%20za%20rad%20n
a%20predmetima%20RZ.pdf [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY]. See also
NATIONAL
WAR
CRIMES
STRATEGY
(2008),
www.adhgeneva.ch/RULAC/pdf_state/War-Crimes-Strategy-f-18-12-08.pdf, for an English
translation of NATIONAL STRATEGY.
42 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graphs 2.2A.1.1,
2.2A.4.1.
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IV. THE IMPACT OF THE ICTY ON DOMESTIC COURTS
A. Introduction
When the ICTY was established in 1993, no thought was given
to cooperation with, or even assistance to, domestic jurisdictions in
the former Yugoslavia.43 The ICTY had specific tasks to perform—
arrests and trials.44 It was busy strengthening its judicial capacity,
developing procedures, and ensuring that the international
community provided the necessary cooperation in gathering evidence
and arresting indictees.45 Fostering the ability of domestic authorities
to address international crimes was not considered one of the
Tribunal’s goals,46 and no resources were allocated toward it.
Moreover, war was still raging in the region during the first years of
the Tribunal’s existence, making geographical and legal remoteness
inevitable. But remoteness was also a policy choice, which continued
to maintain hold after the termination of the armed conflict. The
Court regarded impartiality as requiring it to maintain and display its
distance (geographically, linguistically, politically, and legally) almost
to the extent of indifference to political reality on the ground. In
addition, cooperation with the domestic jurisdictions was considered
a potential threat to the integrity of the international process because
the rule of law remained suspect in all these states.47

43 Varda Hussain, Note, Sustaining Judicial Rescues: The Role of Outreach and
Capacity-Building Efforts in War Crime Tribunals, 45 VA. J. INT’L L. 547, 561 (2005).
44 Louise Arbour, The Crucial Years, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 396, 397 (2004);
DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 1.
45 Refik Hodžić, Bosnia and Herzegovina - Legitimacy in Transition 4,
Presentation at Building a Future on Peace and Justice Conference, Nuremberg
(June 25-27, 2007).
46 David Tolbert, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Unforeseen Successes and Foreseeable Shortcomings, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 5, 12-16
(2002),
http://dialogueonfreedom.org/rol/publications/ceeli_icty_tolbert_fletcher_forum
_2002.pdf.
47 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009). Del Ponte points out that ICTY prosecutors intentionally remained
uninformed about the conflict, ostensibly so as not to compromise their
impartiality. DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 125.
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From the outset, the ICTY suffered from a negative
reputation among the various domestic constituencies in the Western
Balkans, including BiH. Entity institutions in particular often regard
the ICTY as a hostile political body.48 The antagonism toward the
ICTY has been attributed to ignorance among domestic
constituencies as to the Tribunal’s operation as well as to the
dissatisfaction with its perceived bias over whom it chooses to indict.
The popularity of the Tribunal throughout the region is inversely
proportionate to the number of indictees hailing from the majority
ethnic community in question,49 while the minority within each state
has a more positive view of the Tribunal. The only exception is in
FBiH, where the Muslim majority has a better opinion of the
Tribunal than the Croatian minority.50 Nonetheless, the Muslim
community is frustrated with the small number of indictments, the
slowness of the trials, and the perceived leniency of sentences.51 To
counter this phenomenon, ICTY President Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald, with the cooperation of prosecutor Louise Arbour,
established in 1998 the Outreach Programme within the Tribunal to
encourage engagement with domestic authorities52 and to
communicate directly with the people of the former Yugoslavia. The
main focus of the Outreach Programme is to provide information to
key regional stakeholders and the wider public about the work of the
Tribunal to, inter alia, facilitate the transfer of expertise to national
judiciaries.53 Despite these efforts, opinions regarding the ICTY have
not changed dramatically.54 It has been suggested that the Outreach
48 Interview with NGO researcher in Sarajevo (January 2009); Mirko
Klarin, The Impact of the ICTY Trials on Public Opinion in the Former Yugoslavia, 7 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 89, 96 (2009).
49 Hodžić, supra note 45, at 4.
50 Klarin, supra note 48, at 91-92.
51 Id. at 90.
52 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); Arbour, supra note 44, at 401.
53 Assessment and report of Judge Patrick Robinson, Pres. of ICTY,
annexed
to
U.N.
Doc.
S/2009/589,
(Nov.
13,
2009),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/About/Reports%20and%20Publications/CompletionS
trategy/completion_strategy_13nov2009_en.pdf. See also infra § IV.B on capacity
building.
54 Janine Natalya Clark, The Limits of Retributive Justice: Findings of an
Empirical Study in Bosnia and Hercegovina, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 463, 467, 484 (2009);
Klarin, supra note 48, at 92.
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Programme, as well as the legal officers of the ICTY,55 do not
sufficiently acknowledge the influence of the domestic Serb and
Croat political, academic, and cultural elites,56 who propagate the
view that the ICTY is a politically-motivated Western project intent
on undermining Serb and Croat independence.57 This opposition to
the international project of state-building in BiH is reflected in
animosity not only toward the ICTY itself, but also toward
institutions of the state, including judicial bodies. For example, the
unwillingness of entity courts to take the cue from the State Court of
BiH is driven in part by its perception as an internationally imposed
puppet institution.
The completion strategy of the ICTY has nonetheless
brought about a sea change in the relationship between the ICTY and
domestic jurisdiction. The ICTY developed a strong interest in
enhancing the capacity of domestic legal systems to uphold relevant
criminal standards. It engaged more proactively with the
establishment of the War Crimes Chamber (WCS) within the State
Court of BiH, with a view to facilitate the domestic exercise of
criminal justice powers following transfer of cases under Rule 11bis58
and domestically-initiated cases.59 The completion strategy also played
a part in the adoption of new criminal codes and criminal procedure
codes. Regardless, even as late as 2008, there were doubts in the
ICTY, and the international community more generally, about
whether domestic institutions were capable of administering justice
for war-related crimes effectively and in accordance with
international standards.60 This may explain the reluctance on the part
Klarin, supra note 48, at 96.
DEL PONTE & SUDETIC, supra note 7, at 49-50.
57 Clark, supra note 54, at 483. For conflicting views on the Outreach
Program, see Mégret, supra note 24, at 1037-40.
58 Rule 11bis allows the ICTY to refer cases to domestic courts in the
region of the former Yugoslavia.
59 Interviews with official from ICTY Prosecutor’s Office and with
official from the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo (January 2009);
Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo (January 2009).
60 Judge O-Gon Kwon, Discussion: Capacity Building under Time Pressure, 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 682 (2008); William Schabas, Discussion: National v.
International Jurisdiction, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 707 (2008); Thomas Weigend,
Discussion: National v. International Courts, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 681, 704 (2008).
55
56
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of the ICTY to relinquish specific cases or to actively promote
domestic courts (an endeavour which is also constrained by the
ICTY’s limited capacity). Interaction with domestic institutions has
therefore been informed by the acknowledgement of the necessity of
the completion strategy, combined with skepticism as to the viability
of domestic processes and resource limits on both sides. The
following sections examine the normative, quantitative, and
qualitative impact of the ICTY in domestic courts in BiH.
B. The Qualitative Impact of the ICTY—Capacity of Courts
1. Establishment of the WCS
The most fundamental development in capacity enhancement
in BiH with respect to domestic proceedings relating to international
crimes was the establishment of the WCS. The proposal to transfer
cases from the ICTY to the states of the former Yugoslavia was first
tabled by ICTY President Jorda in May 2000.61 However, for a long
time, such relocation was perceived as premature. It was envisaged
for a later stage, when the judicial systems of the relevant states were
reconstructed on democratic foundations, so that they could
accomplish their goal with total independence and impartiality and
with due regard for the principles of international humanitarian law
and the protection of human rights. This would have entailed
international involvement and support in training.62
By late 2002, when President Jorda presented the Security
Council with a further report outlining the completion strategy, the
transfer of cases involving mid- and low-level accused to national
courts had become an essential component of the strategy.63 The
most important condition that national courts were required to satisfy
was the ability to handle transferred cases “effectively and
consistently with internationally recognized standards of human
61 Report on the Operation of ICTY, Identical Letters(Sept. 7, 2000)
from the Secretary-General to the General Assembly Pres. and SCOR Pres., U.N.
Doc A/55/382-S/2000/865, Annex I, para. 42 (May 12, 2000).
62 U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4429th mtg. at 4-5, 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4429
(Nov. 27, 2001).
63 Sarah Williams, ICTY Referrals to National Jurisdictions: a Fair Trial or a
Fair Price?, 17 CRIM. L. F. 177, 182 (2006).

128

2014

Ronen

3:1

rights and due process.”64 The judicial system of BiH was nonetheless
still considered inadequate. The report therefore called for the
creation of a special war crimes chamber in BiH, a concept which
was endorsed by the Security Council.65
The initial reaction to the establishment of the WCS by BiH
officials was lukewarm. BiH officially “welcome[d] the ICTY
initiative to process some of the cases by the domestic judiciary
structures under the auspices of the ICTY,” but added that “the
prosecution and trial of the indicted war criminals in the region
should continue to be a United Nations responsibility.”66 This
position reflected a common refrain in domestic BiH politics,
according to which the ICTY alone was an adequate solution,
although certain elements of domestic society did push for greater
activity by domestic courts in the late 1990s.67 Domestic approval of
the WCS was nonetheless fuelled by the misinformed yet prevalent
conception that, as a result of the various Security Council
Resolutions endorsing the completion strategy, BiH was obliged to
accept defendants that would be transferred from the ICTY in the
future,68 even though the entities were not yet in a position to provide
the accused with a fair trial.69 In addition, frustration with the ICTY
increased, and the state government regarded a special war crimes
chamber as an opportunity to prove to both national and
international audiences that the state institutions in BiH were capable
of performing even the most demanding criminal prosecutions and
64 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated June 17, 2002 from the SecretaryGeneral addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2002/678
(June 19, 2002).
65 S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 28; S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 28.
66 U.N. Doc. S/PV.4429, supra note 62, at 18.
67 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 316.
68 Fidelma Donlon, Rule of Law: from the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia to the War Crimes Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
DECONSTRUCTING THE RECONSTRUCTION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF
LAW IN POSTWAR BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 257, 280 (Dina Francesca Haynes
ed., 2008).
69 Letter dated May 21, 2004 from the President of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991, addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Enclosure II, para. 34, U.N. Doc. S/2004/420 (May 24, 2004).
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that BiH had effectively recovered from the conflict. Simultaneously,
the special war crimes chamber would enable state-level officials to
wrest power away from entity-level institutions under a stamp of
approval by the ICTY. The result was a new and powerful domestic
interest block in BiH pushing for general enhancement of domestic
judicial institutions and for a state-level war crimes court in
particular.70
FBiH representatives, too, were generally supportive of a
special court to deal with war-related crimes as a means of raising
confidence in domestic institutions and awareness of the overall
issues involved.71 In contrast, the RS was resistant to endowing the
State Court with jurisdiction over war-related crimes, as there was
strong concern that the State Court would be biased against Serbs.72
Perhaps a more cynical reason for whatever support was voiced by
either entity’s officials was their interest in preventing ethnicallycharged cases from landing on their own doorsteps.73 The strength of
domestic interests in favor of a state-level war crimes chamber
eventually made possible the adoption of the necessary legislation in
the BiH legislature in November and December 2004.
The procedures and policy of the State Court avoid many of
the shortcomings of the ICTY. These include strictly-imposed
deadlines for trial length; geographical proximity; the absence of a
language barrier; a willingness and intention to investigate and
prosecute crimes committed against Serbs with the same dedication
as all other crimes; and a comprehensive outreach effort, inter alia
adopting the models of communication used by the ICTY.
Burke-White, supra note 35, at 332.
Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prosecution
from the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L. F. 59, 69 (2003).
72 Marija Jandric, EUROBLIC, “They do not trust to the Court in Sarajevo”;
“They do not trust to judges”, cited in OHR BiH Weekend Round-up (July 31- Aug. 1,
2004),
http://www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-media-rep/roundups/print/?content_id=33044; EUROBLIC, “Judge Miso is a nationalist”, cited in OHR
BiH Media Round-up (Jan., 30 2003), www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/bh-mediarep/round-ups/print/?content_id=29143; Glas Srpski, “Open a court in Jasenovac”,
cited in OHR BiH Media Round-up, (Jan. 30, 2003), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=29143.
73 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 330.
70
71
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2. Transfer of know how
A common means of transferring know how and expertise
among institutions is joint work, either within the transferring
institution or within the receiving one. In the relationship between
the ICTY and institutions within BiH, the former form of interaction
was almost completely absent. As part of the ICTY’s initial attitude
of detachment from the region, it was regarded inappropriate to
recruit professionals from the former Yugoslavia, particularly as
judges, on the ground that this would make it difficult to maintain
sufficient distance and neutrality.74 Security concerns were also a
powerful disincentive for hiring nationals of the region.75
This general policy was revised, not as a result of a conscious
decision to develop domestic capacity, but due to the need to speed
up the processes pending before the ICTY. First, the OTP
considered it crucial to acquire knowledge of the conflict and its
background, and to be able to perform in relevant languages. Further
steps were triggered by the notion that most of the work would have
to be done in the region and by the fact that the few people from the
region who went to work at the ICTY proved to be good
professionals.76 However, this change in policy did not make a
substantial contribution to the actual transfer of knowledge and skills
to BiH, at least not in the short term, because people from the region
who started working at the ICTY were unlikely to return to the
region—at least not immediately.77
In contrast, the employment of former ICTY personnel at
the domestic level, mainly at the state level,78 as was the extensive
Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers at The Hague
(January 2009).
75 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers, Victims and
Witnesses Section, Prosecutor’s Office, and others, at The Hague (January 2009).
76 ALEJANDRO CHEHTMAN, DEVELOPING LOCAL CAPACITY FOR WAR
CRIMES TRIALS: INSIGHTS FORM BIH, SIERRA LEONE AND COLOMBIA 23-24
(2011), http://www.domac.is/media/domac/Domac-9-AC-Final-Paper.pdf.
77 This is also true of locals working in victims and witness support.
Interview with official from the ICTY Victims and Witnesses Section at The Hague
(January 2009).
78 Interviews with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
74
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advice offered by other administrative ICTY officers in connection
with the setting up the Court of BiH, have been important elements
of the transfer of knowledge from the ICTY to BiH. This overall
policy appears to have been motivated at least partly by the need to
ensure that the domestic processes satisfy the ICTY’s requirements,
in order to enable the transfer of cases under Rule 11bis,79 rather than
out of direct concern for the development and future of domestic
institutions.80
The international presence within the State Court of BiH
encompasses all units from the judiciary itself to administrative
support. The need for this international participation was
acknowledged even by the RS.81 One of the positive contributions of
this participation has been in deflecting the suspicion and mistrust of
the domestic public toward the domestic judiciary, which had been
seen as unprofessional, corrupt, and biased against members of the
“other” side. Foreign professionals may also be more familiar with
international crimes and jurisprudence and with applying
international standards of due process.
At the same time, it was recognized from the start that the
State Court had to be run and seen to function as a BiH institution,
with domestic actors taking responsibility for early its success. The
appointment of domestic practitioners to lead positions82 gave the
institution a BiH face and identity. One aspect of this is the exclusion
of international judges from presiding over panels. However, this
policy has been controversial. Some suggest that a rotation in panel
presidency could have had a positive impact on the effectiveness and
celerity of the Court, in particular if international judges were to
introduce efficient case management techniques.83 Originally, each
panel was comprised of two international judges and a presiding
domestic judge. At the time of writing, the WCS trial section first-

79 Declaration by the PIC Steering Board, PEACE IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL
(June 12, 2003), http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=30074.
80 Interviews with officials from the BiH Court Registry in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
81 Bohlander, supra note 71, at 68.
82 Law on the Ct. of Bosn. & Herz., art 65.
83 Interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
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instance panels comprise four judges each, one international
and three domestic. As a rule, the domestic judge is the president of
the panel. The appellate division of the WCS consists of one panel
composed of two international judges and a presiding domestic
judge.84 The participation of international judges was intended to be
phased out by 2009,85 but in December 2009 the OHR extended that
mandate of the international judicial and prosecutorial staff for three
years,86 despite strong objection by RS.87
A more fruitful aspect of the informal transfer of knowledge
is the working relationships established between judges and their legal
officers. The younger legal professionals are also usually more
receptive to mentoring and are often better able to adapt to the new
legal framework.
Many other elements nonetheless undermine the process of
transferring knowledge and skills between international and domestic
court officials. One is the selection process of international judges
and prosecutors for the WCS, which has been heavily criticized for
resulting in the appointment of insufficiently qualified professionals. 88
The situation has allegedly improved with the transfer of the
selection process to the domestic High Judicial and Prosecutorial
Council.89 A related problem is the short duration of international

84 STATE COURT OF BIH,
www.sudbih.gov.ba/?opcija=sadrzaj&kat=3&id=3&jezik=e (last visited Feb. 6,
2014).
85 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 7.
86 Dzenana Karabegovic, On Dayton Anniversary, Spirit of Accord Eludes
Bosnia, RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 14, 2009),
http://www.rferl.org/content/On_Dayton_Anniversary_Spirit_Of_Accord_Elude
s_Bosnia/1903958.html.
87 Id.
88 Interviews with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
To this, some locals would add “their unfamiliarity with the domestic system, with
the historical context, with the constitutional structure of BiH, and with its political
context.” Interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
89 DAVID TOLBERT & ALEKSANDAR KONTIC, FINAL REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW SERVICES (ICLS) EXPERTS ON THE SUSTAINABLE
TRANSITION OF THE REGISTRY AND INTERNATIONAL DONOR SUPPORT TO THE
COURT OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND THE PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE OF
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judges’ tenure, and the resultant lack of familiarity with the complex
nature of cases and the cultural and political background within
which they took place.90
Several domestic judges consider the influence of their
international counterparts as generally positive.91 Experienced
domestic judges have not always been willing to be “chaperoned” by
international colleagues.92 Because there has been no institutional
policy regarding the transfer of expertise, interaction between
international and domestic judges, in the form of regular debates over
both substantive and procedural issues, drafting of guidelines by the
international judges, and special training sessions,93 has always been
the product of the commitment of particular judges.
In the prosecution, the mix of international and domestic
professionals in case teams was also viewed as a good method for
domestic legal professionals to increase their knowledge about the
applicability of international instruments on human rights and to
ensure compliance with international standards. The contribution of
international staff to the capacity of domestic legal professionals is
especially important in light of the breadth and complexity of war
crimes cases. Recent reform of the BiH criminal procedure code that
has made the criminal justice system in BiH more adversarial94 and
thus less familiar to domestically-trained professionals, has made
capacity building even more critical. However, a reported lack of trust
and goodwill toward international prosecutors on the part of the first
BiH Chief Prosecutor,95 combined with a post-communist

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA IN 2009 31, 37 (2008), www.iclsfoundation.org/wpcontent/uploads/2009/05/icls-bih-finalreportwebsitecorrected.pdf.
90 Interview with a Prosecutor in Sarajevo (January 2009).
91 E.g., interview with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January
2009).
92 Interview with a judge from the BiH Court and with an official from
the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office at The Hague (January 2009).
93 Interview with judges from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
94 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 10.
95 Interview with an official from the Office of the Prosecutor of the BiH
Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
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institutional culture of reluctance to share information,96severe time
constraints, and heavy workload, obviously affected peer
relationships and the possibility of knowledge- and informationsharing. At the time of writing, there is only one international serving
prosecutor.97
3. Transfer of information
Transfer of cases from the ICTY to domestic courts entailed
an enormous transfer of information and evidence to the domestic
courts. This required the ICTY to provide mechanisms to liaise with
domestic authorities to obtain further relevant information.
Accordingly, for instance, ICTY RPE Rule 75(H) was added in 2007
to allow domestic courts, prosecutors, and defence counsel to obtain
confidential ICTY material.98 This process contributed to interaction
between the ICTY and the domestic courts, particularly the WCS.99
The two tribunals developed a greater sense of horizontal
collaboration and partnership in a common task.100 The ICTY OTP

Interview with an official from the Office of the Prosecutor of the BiH
Court in Sarajevo (January 2009).
97 Prosecutors of Department I, THE PROSECUTOR’S OFF. OF BOSN. & HERZ.,
http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/?id=63&jezik=e&kat=15&opcija=sadrzaj (last
visited Dec. 4, 2013).
98 Interview with an ICTY judge at The Hague (January 2009); Pocar,
supra note 31, at 662; Serge Brammertz, The interaction between international and national
criminal jurisdictions: developments at the ICTY, in CRITERIA FOR PRIORITIZING AND
SELECTING CORE INTERNATIONAL CRIMES CASES 173, 174-75 (Morten Bergsmo
ed., 2009).
99 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Chambers at The Hague
(January 2009). This meant signing a Memorandum of Understanding between the
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and the Special Department for War Crimes
of the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH. BIH PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE BRIEFING BOOK
(2009).
100 This collaboration also meant that the local courts would be able to
voice their needs in a useful way. A judge from the State Court of BiH, for
instance, suggested that the Registry create a web page with instructions on how to
file a request for assistance, something which was taken on board at the Hague.
Interview with official from the ICTY Court management at The Hague (January
2009).
96
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perceived this collaboration as “healthier” since the authorities in the
region are the ones that need to finalize the cases.101
Until 2004 the admissibility in courts in BiH of evidence
collected in ICTY proceedings was unclear to domestic
prosecutors.102 In 2004, BiH adopted a Law on the Transfer of Cases
from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s Office of BiH and the
Admissibility of Evidence Collected by the ICTY in Proceedings
before the Courts. This law permits the use of evidence collected in
accordance with the Statute and the ICTY RPE in proceedings
before the courts in BiH. Borrowing from ICTY RPE 94(b), the
WCS has developed criteria for using ICTY evidence and proven
facts.103 Thus the courts may accept as proven those facts that are
established by legally binding decisions in proceedings by the ICTY
and may accept documentary evidence from proceedings of the
ICTY relating to matters at issue in the current proceedings.104
However, BiH courts may not base a conviction solely, or to a
decisive extent, on the prior statements of witnesses who did not give
oral evidence at trial.105
A perusal of judgments reveals extensive use by the WCS of
evidence from the ICTY regarding, for example, the existence of the
requisite elements of a widespread and systematic attack against a
civilian population;106 the intent by the Serb forces at Srebrenica to
101 Interviews with officials from the ICTY Prosecutor’s Office at The
Hague (January 2009).
102 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 31.
103 Prosecutor v. Vaso Todorović, Case No. X-KRŽ-06/180-1, First
Instance Verdict, 6 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Oct. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v. Momčilo
Mandić, Case No. X-KR-05/58, First Instance Verdict, 52-59 (Ct. of Bosn. &
Herz. July 18, 2007); Prosecutor v. Momčilo Mandić, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/58,
Second Instance Verdict, para. 40, n.2 (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Sept. 1, 2009).
104 Law on the Transfer of Cases from the ICTY to the Prosecutor’s
Office of BiH and the Admissibility of Evidence Collected by the ICTY in
Proceedings before the Courts in BiH, art. 4 (Bosn. & Herz),
http://www.sudbih.gov.ba/files/docs/zakoni/en/BH_LAW_ON_TRANSFER_
OF_CASES_-_Consolidated_text.pdf.
105 Id. at art. 3(2).
106 Prosecutor v. Vuković & Another, Case No. KRŽ-07/405, First
Instance Verdict, 9-10 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Feb. 4, 2008) (basing decision on the
ICTY’s Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac & Vukovic, Case No. IT-96-23& IT-96-
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destroy the protected group;107 the determination that genocide
occurred in the enclave of Srebrenica during the time specified within
the indictment;108 the existence of armed conflict in BiH after April 6,
1992;109 and the fact that genocide occurred in BiH.110 The use of the
2004 Law is not without its own challenges. For example, the
material arrives in English, and its abundance sometimes challenges
domestic prosecutors’ ability to locate relevant evidence.111
Where the entities are concerned, language barriers and
hostility to the ICTY are obstacles to cooperation. The ICTY’s
proactive engagement has almost completely overlooked the courts
of the entities (as have other international bodies). The absence of a
conscious effort to empower domestic institutions does not mean
that the ICTY had no effect at all on the latter, although in view of
the circumstances, such effect was not necessarily positive. For
example, a 2000 Survey in BiH revealed that domestic professionals
felt that the international community saw them as “intellectual
inferiors who did not understand the relevant law.”112 Noting that

23/1-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002) and
Prosecutor v. Kronjelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Mar. 15, 2002)).
107 Prosecutor v. Miloš Stupar et al., Case No. X-KR-05/24, First
Instance Verdict, 103 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 29, 2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Krstić,
Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr.
19, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Blagojević & Jokić, Case No. IT-02-60-A, Judgment
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 9, 2007)).
108 Prosecutor v. Petar Mitrović, Case No. X-KR-05/24-1, First Instance
Verdict, 94 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 28, 2008) (citing Krstić, supra note 107 and
Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107); Prosecutor v. Milorad Trbić, Case No. X-KR07/386, First Instance Verdict, 84-86 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Oct. 16, 2009) (citing
Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107).
109 Mandić, supra note 102, at 57 (basing decision on Prosecutor v. Galić,
Case No. IT-98-29-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
30, 2006)).
110 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 223-29 (basing
decision on Krstić, supra note 107 and Blagojević & Jokić, supra note 107).
111 DIANE ORENTLICHER, THAT SOMEONE GUILTY BE PUNISHED: THE
IMPACT OF THE ICTY IN BOSNIA 121 (2010).
112 HUMAN RIGHTS CTR., INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC (UNIV. OF
CAL., BERKELEY AND SARAJEVO), JUSTICE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL
RECONSTRUCTION 36, 41 (2000),
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ICTY officials failed to keep them informed of the status of the
investigations even in response to direct inquires, these professionals
viewed the ICTY as unresponsive and detrimental to the ability of
BiH courts to conduct national war crimes trials.113 With respect to
the transfer of ICTY evidence, difficulties are exacerbated by the fact
that entity officials do not know which material is available.114 In
contrast to the interaction between the ICTY OTP and the BiH
prosecutor, which takes place on a daily basis,115 requests for
assistance from entity courts number no more than 5-6 a year, mostly
for evidence.
4. Summary
The ICTY was influential in bringing the WCS into existence
and has been involved in its routine operation. This involvement was
facilitated by, and indeed had a part in inducing, the hybrid character
of the WCS. In contrast, the ICTY has displayed disinterest in entity
courts, leading the latter to reciprocate and even to express
resentment toward the Tribunal and a reluctance to take guidance
from it.

http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/IHRLC/Justice_Accountability_and_Social_Re
construction.pdf.
113 Id.
114 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); Interview with official from the ICTY Transition Team at The
Hague (January 2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STILL WAITING: BRINGING
JUSTICE FOR WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, AND GENOCIDE IN
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA’S CANTONAL AND DISTRICT COURTS 29-30 (2008),
www.hrw.org/en/node/62137/section/1 [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
2008]; U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME (UNDP), SOLVING WAR CRIME CASES IN BOSNIA
AND HERZEGOVINA - REPORT ON THE CAPACITIES OF COURTS AND
PROSECUTOR’S OFFICES WITHIN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO INVESTIGATE,
PROSECUTE AND TRY WAR CRIMES CASES 16 (2008).
115 Interview with official from the ICTY Transition Team at The Hague
(January 2009).
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C. Quantitative Impact of the ICTY
1. Prosecution rates
The prevailing view is that had it not been for the ICTY,
there would not have been domestic prosecutions even at the limited
volume in which they exist.116 Yet a quantitative attempt to assess the
impact of the ICTY on prosecution rates and sentencing in the BiH
jurisdictions has proven difficult because the number of cases is too
small for statistically significant findings. In other words, there are no
statistically significant findings on trends in the volume of cases in
domestic jurisdictions, let alone trends that can be attributed to the
relationship of these jurisdictions with the ICTY. An examination of
prosecution rates from 1992 to 2009 nonetheless reveals a few
tentative patterns. The rate of indictment in the WCS has remained
more or less constant since it began to operate in 2005.117 However,
in FBiH and perhaps in RS, a number of waves are discernible that
may be linked to changes in the direct or indirect working
relationship with the ICTY.
2. Impact of the Rules of the Road (RoR) procedure
In FBiH, there was a drop in indictments from 1997 to 2000,
picking up again in 2001.118 In RS there were a handful of indictments
until 1997, and none again until 2003.119 At least in FBiH, this gap
may be related to the Rules of the Road (RoR) procedure introduced
in 1996 (the paucity of indictments in RS prior to 1997 makes it
impossible to identify a similar drop or gap).
The RoR marked the ICTY’s first involvement in domestic
administration of justice in BiH. It was based on an agreement
among BiH, Croatia, and Serbia,120 and responded to unchecked
issuances of indictments for war-related crimes by entity prosecutors.
116 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
117 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 2.2A.1.1.
118 Id. at graph 2.2B.1.1.
119 Id. at graph 2.2C.1.1.
120 In Rome Agreement, BiH-Croatia-Fed. Rep. of Yugoslavia, Feb. 18,
1996.
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The policy of entities prosecuting war crimes without oversight
became particularly problematic as elections in BiH neared and
people traveling to their respective voting places were easy prey for
unmerited arrests, abuse, and restrictions on movement. The RoR
procedure introduced a requirement of ICTY clearance for
prosecutions by the entity authorities. If either of the BiH’s entities’
authorities wished to make an arrest where there was no prior
indictment by the ICTY, they had to send evidence to the RoR Unit
established at the ICTY’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) in order
for the Unit to advise whether or not the available evidence was
sufficient by international standards to justify either an arrest or
indictment.121 The ICTY OTP was not enthusiastic about
undertaking the review of files and questioned whether it was within
the Tribunal’s mandate to do so. The OTP was also concerned that it
lacked the resources to undertake this type of activity and preferred
to focus efforts on potential indictments within its own
jurisdiction.122 Yet, after considerable pressure from states supportive
of the Tribunal, the OTP reluctantly agreed to review the cases
submitted to its office.123 The RoR procedure undoubtedly reduced
the incidence of arbitrary arrests in BiH124 and contributed to the
active participation of displaced people and candidates in the early
elections.
Cases reviewed by the OTP were returned to domestic
authorities with a marking A through H, indicating their suitability for
further investigation or trial. The most common category
designations by the ICTY OTP were A (the evidence was sufficient
by international standards to provide reasonable grounds for the
belief that the accused may have committed the specified serious
violations of international humanitarian law); B (evidence was

121 Agreed
Measures – Rome, 18/2/96, OFF. OF THE HIGH
REPRESENTATIVE, para. 5 (June 18, 2006), www.ohr.int/other-doc/fedmtng/default.asp?content_id=3568.
122 LARA J. NETTELFIELD, COURTING DEMOCRACY IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA: THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL’S IMPACT IN A POSTWAR STATE 243
(2010).
123 Ellis, supra note 32, at 7-8.
124 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2006, supra note 33, at 6.
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insufficient); and C (the ICTY was unable to determine the
seriousness from available evidence).125
Lack of clarity regarding the legal status of the RoR and the
failure to disseminate the rules to relevant entity officials led to
confusion among domestic authorities. As such, a significant number
of cases were heard by entity courts in disregard of the RoR
procedure. In some cases, such discrepancies were resolved by a
retrospective designation as category A by the ICTY OTP or by
prisoner exchanges and early releases from prison.126
The OTP ceased the RoR review on October 1, 2004 in
anticipation of the closure of the ICTY.127 OTP staff reviewed 1,419
files involving 4,985 suspects between 1996 to 2004. Approval under
Category A was granted for the prosecution of 848 persons.128 Of
those, fifty-four (eleven percent) had reached trial stage in domestic
courts by January 2005.129
Some commentators argue that the effect of the RoR was to
stifle domestic courts. The ICTY was notoriously slow in reviewing
cases, in large part due to staff limitations and competing priorities.
The files that the ICTY received were in the local language and were
organized in a way that was entirely alien to international OTP
The significance of the various categories has not been made public.
According to various sources, Category D meant that the ICTY would have
precedence over that individual as a witness. INT’L CRISIS GROUP, WAR CRIMINALS
IN BOSNIA’S REPUBLIKA SRPSKA: WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN YOUR
NEIGHBOURHOOD?, 8 (2000),
www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%2039.ashx). Category G
indicated that the ICTY OTP determined that the evidence for the specified
serious violation of international humanitarian law was insufficient, yet it was
sufficient for a different violation of international humanitarian law. OSCE 2005,
supra note 9, at 5.
126 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 47-48 (citing specific cases).
127 Since 2005, the BiH prosecutor has reviewed war-related cases. This
review, which is sometimes mistakenly mentioned as the continuation of the RoR,
concerns not the quality and sufficiency of the evidence but the allocation of cases
to state or entity instances.
128 Working with the Region, ICTY, http://www.icty.org/sid/96 (last visited
Dec. 4, 2013).
129 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 314.
125
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officers.130 More than 2,300 of almost 6,000 cases sent to the ICTY
were never reviewed and were lost in administrative limbo.131 The
slow processing of other cases and the unsystematic return of
decisions on reviewed cases to the domestic authorities stalled
momentum in the domestic jurisdiction.
ICTY statistics indicate that less than a quarter of the
individuals whose files were reviewed by the OTP were categorized
under classification A, i.e. “evidence sufficient to proceed to arrest
and indictment.” These figures may indicate that, in the majority of
cases, the authorities in BiH were prepared to proceed with the
detention of individuals when the evidence was deficient and basic
international standards were not met. This supports the contention
that the RoR were necessary and met their political objectives. It is
also possible, however, that under-investigated files were deliberately
submitted in some cases in order to exonerate certain individuals.132 It
could be argued that the RoR was conducive to the interests of the
legal authorities in BiH in the sense that they relieved them further of
the responsibility of conducting effective prosecutions,133 which they
tended to regard as falling within the ICTY’s prerogative.134
The small number of cases adjudicated in FBiH from 1997
until 2001 and the complete absence of cases in RS from 1998 until
2003 may also indicate insufficient resolve among prosecutors, police,
and courts to see the cases through.135 But a more nuanced view of

130 Interview with an official from the ICTY Chambers and anonymous
interviewee at The Hague (January 2009).
131 Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in the Former
Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
219, 253-54 (2003); Burke-White, supra note 35, at 313-14.
132 Interview with official from BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009); OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 48.
133 Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
134 BiH Media Roundup, OHR (Feb. 15, 2002), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=6933.
135 Marinko Jurčević, BiH Chief Prosecutor, Speech at the Third
Conference of Chief Prosecutors in BiH at Sarajevo (Nov. 21-22, 2007),
http://www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/files/docs/konferencija_novembarglavni_tuzilac.pdf; INT’L CRISIS GRP., WAR CRIMINALS IN BOSNIA’S REPUBLIKA
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the data is needed to account for the paucity of cases. For example,
war-related crimes have often been prosecuted as ordinary crimes,
particularly in RS.136 On the one hand, impunity is less rampant than
may appear at first sight, but this approach also reflects a refusal by
the local authorities to come to terms with the gravity of past
events.137
3. Progress of the completion strategy
In FBiH and RS, there were surges in indictments in 2001
and in 2003, respectively. This may have been a reaction to the
completion strategy of the ICTY and in anticipation of the
establishment of the WCS. Receipt of cases under the completion
strategy was a mark of prestige for domestic jurisdictions. 138
Therefore, as the completion strategy gained momentum, states in
the region became keen to show that they could administer justice in
accordance with international standards so as to ensure that cases are
transferred to them.139 The BiH government pushed strongly to have
cases referred to it, in part because it recognized the legitimating
effect of the referral. The ICTY’s “carrot” of a case transfer allowed
it to push domestic institutions to meet the benchmarks it had set for
the effectiveness of a domestic judiciary. This effort focused at the
state level, with the establishment of the WCS, but left a mark also in
the entities. In RS in particular, there was support for special courts
at the entity level rather than the establishment of a state level court
to follow up on the work of the ICTY.140 RS authorities argued that a
SRPSKA: WHO ARE THE PEOPLE IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD?, ICG BALKANS
REPORT N° 103, 2 (2000),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/Bosnia%2039.pdf.
136 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 2.2B.4.4.
137 Gordana Katana, Republika Srpska courts shy away from war crimes, BIRN
(undated), www.bim.ba/en/50/10/2316/?tpl=30.
138 Correspondence with Mirko Klarin (Sept. 13, 2010).
139 Interview with official from the ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
140 RS President Dragan Čavić emphasized that the institutions dealing
with cooperation with the Hague Tribunal are making tremendous efforts to prove
they are fully functional and to regain trust. Dragan Jerinic, “We are making
tremendous efforts to prove our cooperation with the Hague,” Nezavisne Novine 4-5, cited in
OHR BiH Weekend Round-up (Oct. 30-31, 2004), www.ohr.int/ohrdept/presso/bh-media-rep/round-ups/print/?content_id=33421.
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separate court beyond the current system would signal loss of
confidence in domestic courts.141 There was also a strong preference
in RS for jurisdiction to lie in the locality in which the crime took
place, and not where the victims resided at the time of trial.
4. Case channelling
A third tentatively-identifiable pattern in the practice of the
entity courts is the increase in indictments in 2006 in both FBiH and
RS. This increase chronologically followed the undertaking by the
WCS since 2005 to channel war-related cases to the entity courts
following a review of their sensitivity and complexity. The criteria for
determination were unclear at the outset.142 However, a National War
Crimes Strategy was formulated in 2008. The Strategy provides a
rationale for the channelling process that is similar to the completion
strategy: to prosecute the most complex and top-priority cases at
state level, with deadlines set at 2015 and 2023. The ICTY assisted in
the drafting of the complexity criteria for the 2008 National War
Crimes Strategy, and, incorporating standards that are a result of the
practice of the international criminal courts,143 the criteria used by the
WCS borrow directly from Rule 11bis of the ICTY RPE.144 The State
Court tries “very sensitive cases,” which are considered the most
complex, taking into account the type and seriousness of the alleged
crime; the rank or political prominence of the defendant; and a
number of other factors, such as whether the case involves “insider”
or “suspect” witnesses, whether there is a risk of witness
intimidation, and whether political conditions are such that a fair trial
may be impossible.145 In another lesson learned from the ICTY, the
WCS opted for transparency of the selection criteria (in general
terms), to preclude accusations of ethnic bias. Some observers argue
Bohlander, supra note 71, at 68-69.
ORENTLICHER, supra note 111, at 128.
143 NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 41.
144 BiH prosecutor, comment made at the Roundtable on the Impact of
International Criminal Courts on Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov. 19-20,
2009).
145 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 10-11; NATIONAL
STRATEGY, supra note 41, at Annex A; NATIONAL STRATEGY, supra note 41, based
on Orientation Criteria from 2004, reviewed in BIRN, PURSUIT OF JUSTICE, supra
note 38, at 9.
141
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that this review process has been instrumental in prompting entity
prosecutors to undertake prosecutions in a more serious and
concerted manner.146
5. Sentencing patterns
It is difficult to assess whether the sentencing patterns in the
BiH jurisdictions are related to those of the ICTY. The paucity of
cases is an obstacle to any quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the
range of sentences available to each of the courts is different. There
are no minimum sentences in the ICTY and the maximum sentence
is life imprisonment. In BiH, sentences may range from ten to fortyfive years of imprisonment, while under the Criminal Code of
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY CC), applied in the
entities, the sentencing range for the more severe war-related crimes
is five to twenty years of imprisonment and one to ten years of
imprisonment for certain other crimes against the laws of war.147
An examination of sentencing against the categories of crime
reveals that the average sentence for genocide-related acts in the
ICTY is twenty-four years imprisonment, compared with a sixteen
years average for crimes against humanity and a ten years average
imprisonment for war crimes.148 The notion of gradation in domestic
jurisdiction can only be examined with respect to the WCS because
only in that court have there been convictions for all three categories
of crimes (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes), and,
to a limited extent in FBiH, where there have been convictions for
genocide and war crimes. There is no scope for gradation in RS
because there are only convictions for war crimes. In BiH, there is a
very apparent difference in sentencing between an average of over
forty years of imprisonment for genocide-related crimes and an
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 11-12.
E.g., SFRY art. 142(1) (regarding war crimes against civilians); SFRY
art. 38 (regarding sentencing), discussed in Prosecutor v. Gojko Janković, Case No.
ICTY-IT-96-23/2PT, Decision on Referral of Case Under Rule 11bis, para. 33-36
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 22, 2005).
148 RONEN WITH AVITAL & TAMIR, supra note 27, at graph 6.4.4.
Arguably, sentences reflect the gravity of the acts rather than the formal offense for
which a person was convicted, which is often a matter of prosecution-defense
negotiations.
146
147
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average of 14.4 and 12.7 years of imprisonment for crimes against
humanity and war crimes, respectively.149 In FBiH, no gradation is
discernible,150 with the average sentence for genocide being 14.7 years
of imprisonment and twelve years for war crimes. The lack of
gradation in sentencing may be, however, a consequence of the fact
that the range of penalties available differs among the various
jurisdictions.151 The relative gravity of ICTY sentences152 may also be
related to the different levels of perpetrators brought before the
ICTY and the domestic courts.
Another factor distinguishing the sentencing patterns in the
domestic jurisdictions from those of the ICTY is that in the absence
of a stare decisis doctrine in BiH jurisdictions, a sentencing standard is
not apparent.153 However, in a lesson learned from the ICTY, the
WCS has adopted a sentencing template (based on BiH law) and has
been developing a reasoned jurisprudence on sentencing.154
6. Summary
There are many challenges in attempting to identify a
quantitative link between the national and international tribunals. The
small number of cases makes any assessment tentative at best, and
the looseness of the findings makes it difficult to establish any
substantive or temporal correlation. Similarly, the loose linkage with
respect to sentencing can be interpreted in conflicting directions. It
Id. at graph 2.2A.4.4.
Id. at graph 2.2B.4.4.
151 Ivan Ivanović, National Legal Advisor on War Crimes, OSCE
Mission to Serbia, Remarks at the Seminar on the Impact of International Courts
of Domestic Proceedings held in Belgrade (Nov. 19-20, 2009).
152 Interview with official from ICTY Outreach Office in Sarajevo
(January 2009).
153 Judge David Re, State Court of BiH, and RS Judge Rudislav
Dimitrijević, Supreme Court of RS, Remarks at the Seminar on the Impact of
International Courts of Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov.19-20, 2009).
154 Prosecutor v. Niset Ramić, Case No X-KRŽ-06/197, First Instance
Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 17, 2007); Prosecutor v. Mitar Rašević & Savo
Todović, Case No X-KR/06/275, First Instance Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Feb.
28, 2008); Prosecutor v. Željko Lelek, Case No X-KRŽ-06/202, First Instance
Verdict (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. May 23, 2008); Stupar, supra note 107. See also Interview
with a judge from the BiH Court in Sarajevo (Jan. 2009).
149
150
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may reflect a true detachment of the domestic from the international
tribunals, or it may reflect the different perpetration levels considered
at the ICTY and in national tribunals. However, as other sections in
this article demonstrate, the domestic institutions are not oblivious to
the international one. In some contexts, such as prosecutorial policy,
the impact of the international judiciary may be less significant than
that of political institutions. Insofar as concerns sentencing, however,
the influence of the ICTY may be more significant. Whether the
ICTY standard is followed or not may depend on different legal
circumstances or on political objection.
D. Normative Impact of the ICTY—Criminal Norms
1.

Impact of the ICTY on legislation

During the period between 1991-1995, when most of the
war-related crimes adjudicated by BiH courts occurred, the criminal
code in force in BiH was the SFRY CC. In 2002, the OHR
commissioned a report on issues relating to war-crime prosecutions
that might take place in BiH155 as part of a general overhaul of the
judicial system156 and in order to meet the challenges of prosecuting
both domestically-initiated cases and cases referred to BiH by the
ICTY under Rule 11bis of its Statute. The report recommended that
existing domestic legislation should serve, as far as possible, as a basis
for new or amended legislation, and that where existing legislation
required revision, amendments should also take into account
developments in the law as applied in the ICTY.157
In 2003 BiH adopted a new Criminal Code (BiH CC), which
differs significantly from its SFRY predecessor. The BiH CC
establishes the offense of crimes against humanity, provides
comprehensively for command responsibility, and applies a different
range of penalties for international crimes from that which applies to

See Bohlander, supra note 71, at 66, 78 (describing the Report of May
27, 2007 in detail).
156 Interviews with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office and from
the ICTY Transition Team in Sarajevo (Jan. 2009).
157 Bohlander, supra note 71, at 78.
155
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ordinary crimes under domestic law.158 The WCS regularly applies the
BiH CC also to pre-2003 cases on the ground that the latter codifies
customary international law.159
The influence of the ICTY on BiH law is noticeable in the
provisions on modes of individual responsibility which refer to
military commanders and civilian superiors.160 Like the ICTY Statute
(and contrary to the ICC Statute), the BiH CC does not expressly
provide for any joint criminal enterprise mode of responsibility. But
the 2003 BiH CC is informed not only by the ICTY’s jurisprudence;
the definition of crimes against humanity (BiH CC Article 172)
follows closely that of the ICC Statute Article 7 rather than the ICTY
Statute Article 5, foregoing a nexus of the act to an armed conflict
and drawing on the ICC Statute’s definitions of various terms
(although it should be recalled that the drafting of the ICC Statute
was itself influenced by ICTY jurisprudence). The provisions on war
crimes borrow from the SFRY CC.161
Unlike the BiH CC, the 2003 criminal codes of FBiH and RS
do not include crimes under international law at all. Consequently,
where the WCS decides not to exercise its primacy, it is not clear
which law should apply in entity courts. BiH institutions, as well as
the Constitutional Court, hold that cases channelled by the WCS to
entity courts carry with them the BiH CC and the entity courts must
apply the principles and safeguards incorporated in the BiH Criminal
Procedure Code, as well as the case law of the WCS.162 Entity courts

158 OSCE, MOVING TOWARD A HARMONIZED APPLICATION OF THE
LAW: APPLICABLE IN WAR CRIMES BEFORE COURTS IN BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 5 (2008) [hereinafter OSCE 2008].
159 E.g. Stupar, supra note 107, at 138-41; Alfredo Strippoli, National
Courts and Genocide: The Kravica Case at the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 577, 581 (2009).
160 CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ. art. 180.
161 Id. at arts. 173-75, 177-79, 181-83.
162 Maktouf, Constitutional Court Appeal No. AP-1785/06, Decision on
Admissibility and Merits, paras. 88-89 (Bosn. & Herz. Mar. 30, 2007). See also Denis
Dzidic, Slow Transfer of Cases Undermines War Crimes Strategy, BIRN Justice Report
(Jan.
5,
2010)
http://publicinternationallawandpolicygroup.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/04/wcpw_vol04issue21.html#bih1; NATIONAL STRATEGY,
supra note 41.
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dispute this and, for the most part, apply the SFRY CC163 on the
ground that BiH CC sentences are heavier and therefore more
detrimental to the defendant.164 In the absence of a formal disputesettling mechanism that is binding upon the entities, the matter
remains unresolved.165
The new criminal procedure codes of 2003 also differ
significantly from their SFRY predecessor. In particular, and in clear
connection with the ICTY Rules and Procedure of Evidence (RPE),
they replaced an inquisitorial with a composite inquisitorialadversarial system, introduced plea bargains,166 and replaced retrials
before the court of first instance by final determinations of cases by
the appeal instance.167 The BiH Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) was
also very much guided by international standards and in particular by
the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).168 The adherence to
the ECHR169 is perhaps the least surprising in the drafting of BiH
legislation because the ECHR forms part of the Constitution of BiH
and enjoys priority over all other law in BiH.170

163 Courts in FBiH have in a limited number of cases applied the interim
1998 FBiH Criminal Code. OSCE 2008, supra note 158, at 10.
164 It is difficult to argue with the stance of the entity courts: as
defendants themselves acknowledge, they are better served by a law which permits
a sentence of 5-20 years’ imprisonment than by one which permits a sentence of
10-45 years’ imprisonment. The historical development of the former law, which is
regularly invoked by the State Court when explaining why its own sentencing range
is less severe than that of the entities’, is of academic, rather than practical,
significance.
165 Interview with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in
Sarajevo (January 2009).
166 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 12.
167 OSCE, TRIAL MONITORING REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE IN THE COURTS OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA 2 (2004) [hereinafter OSCE 2004].
168 Office of the High Representative, Decision Enacting the Criminal
Procedure Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
No.
35/03,
preambular
para.
8
(Jan.
24,
2003),
www.ohr.int/decisions/judicialrdec/default.asp?content_id=29094.
169 Silvia Borelli, Domestic Investigation and Prosecution of Atrocities Committed
During Military Operations: The Impact of Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights,
46 ISR. L. REV. 369 (2013) (on file with author).
170 BIH CONSTITUTION, art. II(2).
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2. Impact of the ICTY on jurisprudence
The 2002 OHR-commissioned report recommended that the
jurisprudence of the ICTY have persuasive authority in the judicial
interpretation of legislation—addressing both procedural and
substantive matters—at both the state and entity levels. However, it
was acknowledged that, in view of the differences between the
international and domestic legal systems, it would be infeasible for
domestic courts to fully follow the jurisprudence of the ICTY. The
report therefore recommended the adoption of a regulation stating
that the courts should take into account the jurisprudence of the
Tribunal.171
The BiH prosecution shared the view that reliance on ICTY
jurisprudence is an important element in providing for uniformity in
interpretation of principles and rules.172 Although the ICTY is not the
only international institution influencing the WCS in this fashion, it
has had the most pronounced impact.173 The library of the WCS
includes a complete collection of the ICTY’s jurisprudence and all of
the judges in the WCS have been instructed on the Tribunal’s
jurisprudence.174
The WCS has followed the spirit of the OHR-commissioned
report,175 relying on the jurisprudence of the ICTY to: (1) establish
that certain provisions in the BiH CC reflect customary international

Bohlander, supra note 71, at 78.
Ibro Bulić, State Prosecutor, Application of International Sources of
Law in BiH, Presentation at the International Conference on the Implementation
of International Humanitarian Law in National Systems, Budapest, 3 (Oct. 29-30,
2007),
www.tuzilastvobih.gov.ba/files/docs/Primjena_medjunarodnih_izvora_prava_u_B
iH.pdf.
173 BiH prosecutor, comment made in the Roundtable on the Impact of
International Criminal Courts on Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade (Nov. 19-20,
2009).
174 Burke-White, supra note 35, at 343.
175 Noted with respect to CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art.171 (genocide);
Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 53; CRIM. C. BOSN. & HERZ., art.
180, which duplicated ICTY Statute Art. 7; and Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra
note 108, at paras. 171-73, 205.
171
172
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law, thereby confirming its own jurisdiction ratione materiae;176 (2) to
characterize the conflict in the former Yugoslavia as international;177
and (3) to assist in the analysis of a great number of concepts and
elements of crimes.178 In some cases, rulings by the WCS do not
176 E.g. Prosecutor .v Kovacević, Case No. X-KR-05/40, First Instance
Verdict, at 41 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Nov. 3, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mirko Pekez &
Milorad Savić, Case No. X-KRŽ-05/96-1, Second Instance Verdict, at para. 37 (Ct.
Bosn. & Herz. May 5, 2009); Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at para.
172.
177 Prosecutor v. Abduladhim Maktouf, Case No. K-127/04, First
Instance Verdict, 9 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 1, 2005); Prosecutor v. Abduladhim
Maktouf, Case No. KPŽ-32/05, Second Instance Verdict, 9 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz.
Apr. 4, 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Blaskić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004) and Prosecutor v. Kordić &
Čerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001)).
178 See Mitrović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 23 (citing the
ICTY’s Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177) (discussing “widespread”
and/or “systematic” attacks); Mitrović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at 4750 (citing ICTY’s Krstić, Judgment, supra note 107; Blagojević & Jokić, supra note
107); Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 177-202 (citing Krstić,
Judgment, supra note 107; Blagojević & Jokić, Judgment, supra note 107; Prosecutor
v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the Former
Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007); and Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-200171-I (July 15, 2004), among others) (analyzing the elements of genocide);
Prosecutor v. Damir Ivanković, Case No. X-KR-08/549-1, First Instance Verdict,
at 10-11 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. July 2, 2009) (citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra
note 106; Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177; Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-9724-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006))
(analyzing the elements of crimes against humanity); Kovacević, First Instance
Verdict, supra note 176, at 44 (citing ICTY’s Kronjelac, Judgment, supra note 106);
Prosecutor v. Dragan Damjanovic, Case No X-KR-05/51, First Instance Verdict,
at 47-48 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Dec. 15, 2006) (citing Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case
No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14,
2000) and Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 25, 2004)); Mandić, First Instance Verdict,
supra note 103, at 133-34 (citing Prosecutor v. Naletilić & Martinović, Case No. IT98-34-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2003))
(analyzing the elements of persecution); Pekez & Savić, Second Instance Verdict,
supra note 176, at para. 38 (citing Blagojević & Jokić, Judgment, supra note 107)
(discussing civilians); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 130, (citing
Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (discussing protected persons); Damjanović, First Instance Verdict,
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mention the ICTY expressly but mirror its judgments so closely that
given that they concern identical events, it is probable that ICTY case
law influenced the decisions of the WCS. ICTY influence is also
visible with respect to procedural norms, such as when ruling on the
admissibility of illegally-obtained evidence.179 The ICTY has also had
some impact on the factors that inform sentences in the WCS. For
example, in Todorović, the WCS cited the ICTY judgments in Zelenović
and Erdemović to determine that a plea bargain constitutes a mitigating
factor in sentencing and the Erdemović judgment to determine that the
provision by the defendant of direct evidence for facts otherwise
requiring proof is a mitigating factor in sentencing.180 At the same
time, WCS judgments are also replete with references to international
law in general and to international tribunals other than the ICTY,
especially the ICTR but also the ICJ, the Special Court of Sierra
Leone, and even domestically-established courts, such as the U.S.

supra, at 44-45 (citing Naletilić & Martinović, Judgment supra) (discussing the
element of discrimination in crimes against humanity); Mandić, First Instance
Verdict, supra note 103, at 134 (citing Kronjelac, Judgment, supra note 106)
(discussing imprisonment as a crime against humanity); Pekez & Savić, Second
Instance Verdict, supra note 176, at para. 57 (citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra
note 106) (discussing the nexus between the defendant’s act and the armed conflict
as an element in war crimes); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 129
(citing Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra note 106; Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177;
and Prosecutor v. Halilović, Case No. IT-01-48-A, Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Oct 16. 2007)); Pekez & Savić, Second Instance Verdict,
supra note 176, at paras. 140-42 (citing Commentary to the Geneva Convention IV;
Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177; Kunarac et al., Judgment, supra note
106; Naletilić & Martinović, Judgment, supra) (discussing intentional infliction of
severe physical or mental pain); Damjanović, First Instance Verdict, supra, at 23
(discussing inhumane acts); Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 102, at 13536 (citing Kuperskić, Judgment, supra; Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177)
(discussing inhumane acts); Ibro Bulić, State Prosecutor, Application of
International Sources of Law in BiH, supra note 172, at 4-5 (discussing elements of
ethnic cleansing and of various violations of the laws or customs of war, including
of rape and sexual abuse).
179 Prosecutor v. Zijad Kurtović, Case No X-KR-06/299, First Instance
Verdict, at 23 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Apr. 30, 2008) (relying on Kordić & Čerkez,
Judgment, supra note 177; Brđanin, Judgment, supra note 178); Mandić, First
Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 117-18 (relying on Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment,
supra note 177).
180 Todorović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 28-29.
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military tribunal at Nuremberg.181 With respect to procedural norms,
the European Court of Human Rights has also been influential.182
An area in which international jurisprudence and ICTY
jurisprudence in particular have played a significant role in the
jurisprudence of the WCS is command responsibility, which was not
regulated under the SFRY law which governed BiH until 2003. The
WCS has ruled that command responsibility has nonetheless been
regulated in some form by domestic law, and was criminalized under
customary international law at the relevant time.183 According to the
WCS, the new BiH CC’s Article 180(2), which codifies command
responsibility, derives from and is identical to ICTY Statute Article
7184 and must be interpreted in light of its international origins and its
international judicial interpretation and definitions.185 Although not
bound by the decisions of the ICTY, the WCS was “persuaded that
the ICTY’s characterization of command responsibility, and its
elements properly reflects the state of customary international law as
it existed at the times relevant to the [i]ndictment.”186 Accordingly it
found it “helpful to review the evidentiary factors” which “the ICTY,
and other international courts have found relevant to determining
whether the prosecution has successfully met its burden of
establishing liability under the principle of command responsibility, as
guidance in reviewing the evidence in the instant case.”187 The WCS
relied on ICTY judgments to establish the elements of “effective

181 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 177-202, (citing
Ndindabahizi, supra note 178; U.S. v. Wilhelm von Leeb et. al. (the High
Command Case), 12 LRTWC 1, 59 (1948)).
182 Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 116-18 (relying on
ECtHR’s Khan v. UK and PG and HJ v. UK); Prosecutor v. Dragan Damjanović,
Case No. X-KRŽ-05/51, Second Instance Verdict, 14 (Ct. Bosn. & Herz. Jun. 13,
2007).
183 Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 138-39, 141.
184 Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 151 (citing Halilović,
Judgment, supra note 178; Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/t-A,
Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000), and
others).
185 Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 135.
186 Id. at 141.
187 Id.
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control”188 and other elements of the doctrine.189 The jurisprudence
of the WCS also reflects the differences in views within the ICTY
with respect to certain elements of command responsibility, such as
whether responsibility as a commander for acts of genocide requires
a commander to share the special genocidal intent.190
The WCS also followed ICTY jurisprudence in accepting the
existence of the joint criminal enterprise doctrine,191 which, as noted
above, is not expressly established under either the ICTY Statute or
the BiH CC. It now co-exists uneasily with co-perpetration that is
expressly provided for in the BiH CC.192

188 Mandić, Second Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at paras. 106-09
(citing Prosecutor v. Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Mucić et al., Case No. IT96-21, Appeal Judgment (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20,
2001); and Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment supra note 177).
189 E.g., Mandić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at 151-52 (citing
Mucić, Appeal Judgment, supra note 188; Halilović, Judgment, supra note 178;
Blaskić, Judgment, supra note 177; Kordić & Čerkez, Judgment, supra note 177);
Mandić, Second Instance Verdict, supra note 103, at para. 109; Stupar, First
Instance Verdict, supra note 107, at 140-41.
190 BiH prosecutor, comment at DOMAC Seminar (Nov. 19, 2009);
Strippoli, supra note 159, at 590-91. The WCS, too, avoided answering the question
definitively, noting that, in the circumstances, it had been proven beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant in fact had the specific genocidal intent.
Stupar, First Instance Verdict, supra note107, at 162-63.
191 Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at para. 205 (noting that
Article 180 of the Criminal Code of Bosnia and Herzegovina duplicated ICTY
Statute Article 7, which has been interpreted as encompassing JCE); Strippoli, supra
note 159, at 586.
192 Strippoli, supra note 159, at 587 (citing Prosecutor v. Vuković &
Another, Case No. KRŽ-07/405, Second Instance Verdict, at 6, n.1 (Ct. Bosn. &
Herz. Sept. 2, 2008) and noting that no importance is given to the use of the word
perpetrating instead of committing). Interestingly, in Vuković, the Trial Chamber relied
on ICTY jurisprudence to establish joint criminal enterprise as a mode of criminal
responsibility in the context of Bosn. & Herz., Criminal Code, Art. 29 (2003),
which applies to all offenses, rather than in the context of Bosn. & Herz., Criminal
Code, Art. 180 (2003), which concerns modes of liability for crimes under
international law. Vuković, First Instance Verdict, supra note 106, at 20; Rašević &
Todović, First Instance Verdict, supra note 154, at 111; Prosecutor v. Rašević &
Todović, Case No. X-KR/06/275, Second Instance Verdict, at 26 (Ct. Bosn. &
Herz. Nov. 6, 2008). A further confirmation that JCE forms part of customary
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The impact of the ICTY jurisprudence in entity courts is
much less pronounced than in the WCS. While entity courts do not
consider themselves bound by ICTY jurisprudence, the ICTY is an
authority that they respect and to which they look.193 However, the
fact that ICTY jurisprudence was not, at first, translated to
Bosnian/Serb/Croat prevents it from being directly accessible to
entity courts.194 Parties and judges in the entity courts do not usually
cite international or foreign jurisprudence195 and the decisions of
these courts are often at odds with international jurisprudence on
issues as important as the validity of the superior responsibility
doctrine196 or whether a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
requires inhumane treatment to have resulted in “great suffering or
serious bodily injury” in order to be a crime under SFRY CC Article
142.197
3. Summary
The ICTY has had a limited impact on BiH legislation. This
may be explained by the development of applicable standards and
models in the period between the adoption of the ICTY statute and
the enactment of the BiH CC. In contrast, ICTY jurisprudence has
influenced the work of the WCS. In the entities, the ICTY has had
little impact on both law and jurisprudence.
Even where ICTY law has been incorporated formally into
the law of BiH and its entities, its implementation has often
experienced difficulties. Thus, it has been argued that certain aspects

international law is in Trbić, First Instance Verdict, supra note 108, at paras. 206,
211.
193 Judge Rudislav Dimitrijević, Supreme Court of RS, Remarks at the
Seminar on the Impact of International Courts of Domestic Proceedings, Belgrade
(Nov. 19-20, 2009).
194 Interview with an official from the BiH Prosecutor’s Office in
Sarajevo (January 2009).
195 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 21-22.
196 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH 2008, supra note 114, at 55-56 (citing Mirsad
Čupina, Verdict No. K-24/99 (Mostar Cantonal Ct. Jan. 24, 2007); Mirsad Čupina,
Verdict Number K-455/01 (S. Ct. of Federation BiH Sept. 11, 2003)).
197 OSCE 2005, supra note 9, at 21 (describing Čupina, Verdict by Mostar
Cantonal Ct., supra note 196).
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of the criminal procedure reform expedited the holding of trials and
enhanced the effectiveness of BiH’s legal system, particularly at the
State Court level.198 However, the new rules also created confusion
and frustration among domestic professionals,199 leading to
widespread resistance to their application.200 Much of this adverse
reaction was generated by the fact that several of the reforms were
entirely foreign to the domestic legal traditions, and the perception
that local legal traditions were not properly understood and regarded
with contempt by international institutions.201 Although the Criminal
Procedure Code was drafted by a team of BiH lawyers, the code in its
entirety was perceived as being internationally imposed,202 not least
because it was ultimately enacted by the OHR.
CONCLUSION
BiH is a good experimentation and observation ground for
modalities of interaction between international and domestic courts.
198 Interviews with a judge from the BiH Court and an official in the
Court of BiH Prosecutor’s Office in Sarajevo (January 2009). See also Christopher
DeNicola, Criminal Procedure Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Between Organic
Minimalism and Extrinsic Maximalism, DEPAUL RULE OF L. J. (2010),
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=christopher
_denicola.
199 DeNicola, supra note 198, at 67. This confusion was certainly not
helped by the Council of Europe hiring local practitioners, trained in the
continental system, to draft the commentaries to these new procedural rules.
200 Interviews with NGO representatives in Sarajevo (January 2009). An
OSCE report based on the monitoring of over one hundred trials indicated that
over 25% of judges, prosecutors, and defence attorneys were ‘not accomplishing a
shift’ to the new procedure. OSCE 2004, supra note 167, at 27-34.
201 DeNicola, supra note 198 (citing U.N. MISSION IN BIH, JUDICIAL
ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, THEMATIC REPORT X: SERVING THE PUBLIC—THE
DELIVERY OF JUSTICE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 32 (2000),
http://www.hjpc.ba/docs/jasp/pdf/TR%20X%20delivery%20of%20justice%20%20delays.pdf) (noting that BiH’s inquisitorial system is a product of an “old legal
philosophy”).
202 Interview with a Legal Adviser in Bosn. & Herz. (January 2009). Our
interviewees seem to disagree with DeNicola regarding the fact that local drafters
were directed by international or foreign players into drafting mixed procedure.
Rather, they suggest that many of the relevant changes were established out of
personal and professional conviction. Cf. DeNicola, supra note 198.
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Within the same country there are courts of different levels, which
illustrate different models of interaction. Because these courts appear
to operate within the same domestic culture, one might assume that
any differences in domestic action are indeed attributable to different
modalities of interaction with the ICTY.
At the turn of the millennium, the ICTY was severely
criticized for failing to have an impact on critical justice issues,
including its non-provision of assistance to the reform of the justice
systems in the region, and lack of involvement in preparing the local
prosecutors and courts to carry out investigations and trials regarding
war crimes.203 A decade later, it might be fairer to say that the ICTY’s
engagement with domestic institutions arrived too late, but overall
was, and remains, of some value.204
An analysis of the impact of the ICTY on the judicial
institutions in BiH, namely the WCS and entity courts, reveals a
significant difference in the extent and tone of interaction. The WCS
has been much more closely associated with the ICTY than the entity
courts, which have been reluctant to accept external influence and to
interact with international actors.
Thus, at the BiH state level, dramatic reforms have taken
place since the end of the war, especially since the completion
strategy was put in place. These reforms include the establishment of
the WCS within the State Court and the adoption of criminal and
criminal procedure codes. International elements played a key role in
promoting and shaping these reforms. The role of the ICTY has
varied from one aspect to another.
First and foremost is the establishment of the WCS which is
directly, although not exclusively, related to the progression of the
completion strategy. The latter not only has precipitated the transfer
of cases and evidence, but also know-how and expertise.
Tolbert, supra note 46, at 12.
David Talbot & Aleksandar Kontic, The International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia: Transitional Justice, the Transfer of Cases to National Courts, and
Lessons for the ICC, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 135, 160 (Carsten Stahn & Göran Sluiter eds., 2009).
203
204

157

2014

Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs

3:1

Consequently, BiH has been able to assume the responsibility of
sharing with the ICTY the burden of trying war related offences,
largely in accordance with international standards. However,
international influence has been, at least at the outset, a by-product of
the ICTY’s and other international institutions’ concerns and goals
rather than the consequence of a conscious effort at modelling the
domestic system. Thus, for example, the interest in establishing the
WCS and in the transfer of cases to BiH, as well as the empowering
of domestic institutions, are the consequence of the ICTY’s
completion strategy and shaped by its needs.
Quantitatively, the impact of the ICTY is in some aspects
very immediate but of little long-term significance, and of more
lasting value in others. An example of the former is the transfer of
cases from the ICTY to the WCS under Rule 11bis, as well as the
transfer of files in which no indictment had yet been issued. At this
level, one could say that the prosecution patterns of the WCS are
directly related to the ICTY’s work. However, one must acknowledge
that because this will only occur once in the lifespan of the WCS, it
does not by itself hold the promise of the WCS following ICTY
prosecuting policy. A more interesting influence is illustrated by the
fact the primacy of the WCS over entity courts, and by the criteria it
adopted to determine which cases should be channelled to which
domestic jurisdiction, which is expressly in pursuance of the ICTY’s
policy. The WCS also emulates the ICTY in the subtle adoption of
gradated sentencing depending on the characterization of crimes.
On the normative level, the state of BiH and the WCS has
followed the ICTY in a variety of manners. First, they adopted,
through legislation and jurisprudence, various international legal
doctrines. The WCS also interprets domestic instruments in light of
ICTY jurisprudence and follows the ICTY in procedural issues.
In contrast to the close links between the WCS and the
ICTY, the impact of the ICTY on entity institutions has been much
less marked. The impact of the ICTY on their capacity is not only
limited, but also mostly unintended. Very little funding is directed
toward the entities and there is little focus on nurturing their
institutions. If anything, this disregard has led to antagonism in the
entities that has negatively impacted institutional capacity. The
158
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entities’ resistance is directed not only against the ICTY but also
against the State Court, which, despite its domestic legitimacy, has
failed to impose its standards on entity courts. The role of the WCS
in channelling cases, as it is being discharged, has also been cited as
detrimental to the empowerment of entity institutions.
Generally speaking, entity institutions are characterized by
their resistance to prosecution. On the normative level, it is notable
that parties and judges in entity courts do not usually cite
international or foreign jurisprudence, and the decisions of these
courts are often at odds with international jurisprudence. For
example, important substantive legal doctrines developed by the
ICTY such as command responsibility have been disregarded, if not
outright rejected. ICTY jurisprudence on procedural issues has not
fared much better, as demonstrated by the fundamental controversy
on the applicability of post-conflict law in entity courts.
The schism between entity institutions and the ICTY is partly
attributable to practical constraints. The ICTY is much less accessible
to entity institutions than it is to the WCS. First there is the language
barrier, which only in recent years the ICTY has been laboring to
overcome. In addition, there is a gap in international funding which
leaves the training initiative almost exclusively reserved to the WCS.
It has been suggested that better results could have been obtained if
the international activity directed at empowering domestic authorities
had begun earlier or if more attention had been paid both to the
potential influence of the ICTY’s practice on domestic authorities
and to the domestic constraints which international efforts should
accommodate. For example, ICTY case law and investigative material
could have been accessible at an earlier stage, and training initiatives
could have been more accurately designed for the relevant audience’s
needs.
It may be argued that the issue is not technical incapacity or
misdirection of international resources, but, instead, a more profound
issue. Particularly in RS, where there has not effectively been a postconflict change of government, domestic institutions are not keen to
undertake prosecutions and the trickle-down effect of the
international tribunal has been therefore very limited. The reluctance
to engage in post-conflict criminal justice is politically-grounded.
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External engagement incentivises some actors and alienates others,
particularly the Serb community.205
The WCS’s susceptibility to ICTY influence is strongly and
directly related to its hybrid nature, owing to the circumstances of its
establishment, namely through institutional and normative dictates of
the High Representative. In other words, the WCS is a partner in the
international mechanism largely because it is the product of
international intervention in BiH. We should therefore not be blinded
by the apparent success of the WCS. It was made possible by the
strong international influence, which effectively circumvented the
political obstacles standing in the way of accountability
mechanisms.206 It would be more accurate to describe the
international effect over domestic institutions as dependant on the
capacity to impose, rather than as a spontaneous ripple effect. While
the limitations of extrapolating from the BiH case study should not
be underestimated, an important lesson to be drawn by those
designing international tribunals as catalysts for domestic action is the
importance of engaging with potential political obstacles to preempt
their obstruction of even the best-planned legal framework.

David Kaye, External Actors and Domestic Accountability,
Presentation at the First Annual Minerva Jerusalem Conference on Transitional
Justice: The Potential Role of Transitional Justice in Ongoing Conflicts, Jerusalem
(Nov. 13-15, 2011).
206 See also Talbot & Kontic, supra note 204, at 160.
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